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IV 
JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has certiorari jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3-102(3)(a), which provides for appellate jurisdiction in this Court over all 
judgments of the Court of Appeals. 
QUESTION PRESENTED & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-413(5) violates the Equal Protection Clauses of 
the Utah and United States Constitutions by discriminating on the basis of age. 
On certiorari, this Court "review[s] the decision of the court of appeals," and not 
that of the Labor Commission (which had no jurisdiction to decide the issue before this 
Court in any event). State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125,1f 25, 63 P.3d 650. The 
constitutionality of § 413(5) is a question of law, which is reviewed by this Court for 
correctness, "granting no deference to the legal conclusions of the court of appeals." 
State v. Valdez, 2006 UT 39,1} 11, 140 P.3d 1219. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL & STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const, amend. XIV § 1: 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they 
reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Uniform Operation of Laws Clause of the Utah Constitution, art. 1 § 24: 
"All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation." 
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Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(5): 
Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the 
compensation payable by the employer, its insurance carrier, or the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund, after an employee has received compensation from the 
employer or the employer's insurance carrier for any combination of disabilities 
amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable total disability 
compensation rate, shall be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar 
amount of 50% of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the 
employee during the same period. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises at the intersection of two "wage-replacement" elements of 
American worker-protection legislation: workers compensation and Social Security. 
Both are aimed at protecting employees and their dependents from the adverse effects of 
wage loss. Workers compensation insures against a portion of the wages lost as a result 
of on-the-job injuries. Social Security provides limited protection against wage 
reductions expected when workers reach retirement age or become disabled. 
Because these two programs share a common goal, both workers compensation 
and Social Security laws include "coordination of benefits" provisions. Under Social 
Security law, the sum of workers compensation and Social Security disability benefits 
may not exceed 80% of the worker's "average current earnings." 42 U.S.C. § 424(a). 
Under the workers compensation provision at issue in this case, workers compensation 
wage-loss benefits are reduced, after a base period of 312 weeks, by 50% of the Social 
Security retirement ("SSRI") benefits received by the employee. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-
2-413(5) (2004) ("§413(5)"). 
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Such coordination piosisioiis iwoiiiii/e the uu flipping nature of these two 
P OL; ' «luce the costs of administering these systems by limiting overlapping 
recoveries from both workers compensation insurance and Soo.il Security, m , _. 
these prudent goalb. i)otii >i>t;ai ^ • ..; -. • • ; -•• . -i 
pi 11' ii um\ kn r htrn r«»nsisitMill> upheld by the courts against constitutional challenges 
like those asserted in this case. See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 IT S. n$. N J ^ 
(upholding Social Security offset provision against cuiv.iituliuii.il \ liallcngc); John 
Tobin's Case, < M)7) (asserting that "there is universal 
agreement that [such] statutes ... promote legitimate governmental goals"). 
This court should follow those precedents and uphold the consliiiilion.ilih nil «'. 
4; ••! • \icin.. ..ics^o M)>,au ; -J ut ultimately he is asking 
this ( uui I id second-guess the legislature's policy judgment as to the appropriate level of 
workers compensation benefits. Nothing in the United States or Utali Constitutions 
provides a ioounnu K-I mat aip. .•: • t. 
I. \\'f > K KK U S COMPENSATION 
Before the universal enactment of workers compensation laws, workplace injuries 
were subject to the uncertainties and cmnplcMiies oftim/ inn w stem \n employee who 
.\ »'Hsasa result of an industrial accident could recover 
compensation only if he could survive the protracted gauntlet of a ci\ :l tort 1^11 by 
showing negligence on the part of the employer ;...-.: * . 1 im: . 
negligence oi ..llicr defenses aihanenl in Ihr still 
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Workers compensation represents a fundamental compromise between workers 
and their employers, both of whom gave something up in substituting an administrative 
system of workers compensation for the common-law tort system.1 Under workers 
compensation law, workers who suffer workplace injuries are entitled to compensation 
without any proof of fault or negligence on the part of the employer. Workers 
compensation awards are thus available under a more streamlined, efficient procedure 
than that available under the tort system. See Park Utah Consolidated Mines Co. v. Ind. 
Comm'n, 36 P.2d 979, 981 (Utah 1934) (Utah Workers Compensation Act affords 
"simple, adequate, and speedy means of securing compensation"). 
At the same time, a workers compensation award is more limited than a 
compensatory damages award in tort. "A compensation system, unlike a tort recovery, 
does not pretend to restore to the claimant what he or she lost; it gives claimant a sum 
which ... will presumably enable claimant to exist without being burden to others. ... 
[T]he amount of compensation awarded may be expected to go not much higher than is 
necessary to keep the worker from destitution.5' Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 
1.03 [5] (2006). 
Such limited benefits are the exclusive remedy of a worker covered by the 
Workers Compensation Act. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105 "A central idea of the 
compensation movement was that a complying employer, in exchange for accepting 
1
 The elements of the tradeoff or compromise inherent in the Utah Workers 
Compensation Act are summarized in tabular form in Addendum 1 hereto. 
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compensatioii liability \ \ Itlioi it fai lit, \ v 01 il i 1:> * i elie\ ed of additi ::)iial liability beyond the 
benefits p ro \ ided b> the Compensation Act." Oliveras v. Caribou-Four Corners, Inc., 
598 P.2d 1320, 1323 (Utah 1979). 
Workers compensation a\v = .x - * ! • ' • ^:is— F m n l r w r s 
nnjsl .secure (he p;i\nn (ml nf workers compensation benefits by purchasing a workers 
compensation policy from a licensed insurance carrier or by establishing a self-iliiKscu 
program authorized by the Labor Commission, u tan t .ie 11, § 34 \ 2-201. 
liifural workers IUIIN he eligible for h \ "f n the form of disability payments, 
wage-loss compensation, and payment of medical expenses. The nature and extent of 
benefits depend in part on whether the injury is classified as .» : empoKin ! i i * 
( T T I M H ' f a h l o d e , - < -. • i ^ l i n * Pl)> r J i a h C o d e 
A iin § 34A-2-411), a Permanent Partial Disability (PPD) (Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
412), or a Permanent Total Disability (PTD) (Utah Code A nn. § J4A-J-41 .<) in lliis 
case, petitioner Merrill lufleicd «i I"" I I) ineaiiing lli.il lie win deemed uiiiihle lo relurn lo 
gai' • •;* • • • • mpIo\ ee like Merrill who suffered a PTD between July 1, 
1997 and July 1, 1998 is entitled to payment of his medical expenses and also to wage-
loss compensation of i-.*o i; i.*:^-; ;;: * \ „•. .i> -.WIL . *'- ; 
( \K\V Ann, $ 'M \ T 4 1 M 1 » ( P I D benefits are "66-2 /3% of the employee 's average 
weekly wage at the t ime of the injury." not (o exceed " 8 5 % of the state average weekly 
wage") ; Quick Reference Grid, available at 
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http://laborcommission.utah.gov/IndustrialAccidents/Publications/pdfs/QUICK%20R^ 
ERENCE%20GRID%202007.pdf (last accessed: Feb. 18, 2008). 
Workers compensation legislation requires an ongoing legislative policy judgment 
as to the appropriate level of wage-replacement benefits—a level that properly balances 
the need to provide partial wage-replacement for employees against Ihe goal of assuring 
an efficient system that is economical far employers. Coordination of benefits provisions 
are one mechanism for balancing these objectives. 
Such provisions extend beyond the statutory provision at issue in this case. Under 
the Utah Workers Compensation Act, for example, workers compensation benefits are 
offset by any recovery from a third party. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5). As this 
Court has indicated, this provision advances the important goal of avoiding "[djouble 
recovery for injuries or death sustained in conjunction with an accident covered by 
workers' compensation." Esquivel v. Labor Commission, 2000 UT 66, TJ 23, 7 P.3d 777. 
Section 413(5) has a similar goal. During the House floor debates on the bill that 
led to this provision, representatives expressed concern about the rising costs and 
insurance premiums associated with workers compensation insurance. H.R., Floor 
Debate, 47th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 16, 1988). The Social Security offset provision 
was seen as a way to limit the cost of workers compensation coverage without imposing 
an undue burden on injured workers. Id. With that in mind, § 413(5) assures an initial 
base period of 312 weeks when foil PTD wage-replacement benefits are available without 
any Social Security offset. After that period, however, the statute provides for a 
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reduction or offset of workers compensation benefits "by the dollar amount of 50% of the 
Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same period." 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 (2004). 
II. SOCIAL SECURITY 
Social Security is also known as "Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance" 
("OASDI"). The specific component of OASDI at issue here is the Social Security 
"retirement" insurance ("SSRI") benefit—also known as "Old Age and Survivors 
Insurance" ("OASI"). As the Social Security website explains, the OASDI program 
"provides ... protection against the loss of earnings due to retirement, disability and 
death." Overview of the Social Security Administration, 
http://www.ssa.gov/finance/2006/Overview.pdf (last accessed Feb. 18, 2007). For the 
most part, Social Security benefits are financed by the FICA tax on wages—which 
includes an employee contribution and a "matching" contribution from the employer. 
Like workers compensation benefits, Social Security does not provide complete 
compensation for lost wages. Instead, "Social Security benefits are intended to replace a 
portion of... lost earnings and people are encouraged to supplement Social Security with 
savings, pensions, investments, and other insurance. The monthly benefit amount to 
which an individual (or qualifying survivors) may become entitled ... is based on the 
individual's taxable earnings during his or her lifetime." Id. 
To qualify for SSRI benefits, "a worker must have worked in Social Security 
covered employment or self-employment and paid Social Security taxes ... for at least 10 
7 
years (40 credits) over the course of his or her lifetime .... Working Americans can 
count on benefits when they retire, with reduced benefits payable as early as age 62." Id. 
Thus, eligibility for Social Security "retirement" or "old-age" benefits is not tied 
exclusively to age. Instead, eligibility requires a showing of (a) work in "covered 
employment," (b) for a sufficient period of time, and (c) application for benefits from age 
62 on. See also Social Security Practice Guide § 2.03 (Matthew Bender 2006); 20 CFR § 
404.110 (1983). Thus, benefits are not automatically awarded at any age; they are 
available only upon application and compliance with eligibility requirements. 
The amount of such benefits, moreover, turns in part on the age at which the 
worker chooses to retire; reduced benefits are available upon early retirement at age 62, 
while full benefits may be awarded upon retirement and application at an older age. See 
Social Security Online Retirement Planner, http://www.socialsecurity.gov/retire2/ 
agereduction.htm (last accessed: Feb. 18, 2007). Specifically, the "retirement age" at 
which full benefits are available is determined by a sliding scale depending on the 
worker's date of birth, which varies between age 65 and age 67. IdL 
The OASDI system also includes "Social Security Disability Insurance" ("SSDI"). 
SSDI "provide[s] a continuing income base for eligible workers who have qualifying 
disabilities and for eligible members of their families.... Workers are considered disabled 
if [the Social Security Administration] determines that they have a physical or mental 
impairment that prevents them from performing gainful work with earnings above a 
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certain monthly amount." Overview of the Social Security Administration, 
http://www.ssa.gov/finance/2006/Overview.pdf (last accessed: Feb. 18, 2007). 
For SSDI benefits, the Social Security Act includes a coordination or "offset" 
provision with some parallels to § 413(5). Under 42 U.S.C. § 424(a), combined SSDI 
and workers compensation benefits may not exceed 80% of the worker's "average current 
earnings," or "ACE." Thus, SSDI benefits are reduced under §424(a) by an amount 
necessary to stay under this cap. As the Supreme Court explained in upholding the 
constitutionality of this provision, this "offset reflected a judgment by Congress that the 
workmen's compensation and disability insurance programs in certain instances reflected 
a common purpose." Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 82 (1971). The Social 
Security offset provision thus "reduced the duplication inherent in the programs and at 
the same time allowed a supplement to workmen's compensation where the state 
payments were inadequate." Id. at 83. 
III. PETITIONER MERRILL'S WORKERS COMPENSATION AND SOCIAL 
SECURITY BENEFITS, 
The accident that caused petitioner Nathan Merrill's disability occurred on May 
14, 1998. Petitioner's Brief ("Pet. Br.") at 9. Merrill was initially compensated, under a 
compensation agreement approved by the Labor Commission, for a permanent partial 
disability. Id. His injury was subsequently aggravated and permanent total disability 
benefits of $395 per week were awarded effective August 28, 2001. IdL at 9-10. 
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Since the PTD award in 2001, Merrill received the full slate of both workers 
compensation and Social Security benefits for 312 weeks—unreduced by any offset 
under the Social Security Act or the Workers Compensation Act, and regardless of the 
fact that both statutes provide overlapping protection for wage loss. These overlapping 
benefits continued without any offset through August 2007. Id. at 10, 19. 
A precise, complete understanding of Merrill's income and of the impact of § 
413(5) is crucial. Although Petitioner's Brief was incomplete and even misleading in a 
number of respects, the parties have stipulated that the following Table presents a 
complete and accurate summary of the underlying factual record: 
Table A 
Total 
Time Period Sources of Income Yearly 
Income 
At the time of 
the May 14,1998 
injury 
At the time of 
the April 13, 
2001 injury 
After both 
injuries but 
before the 413(5) 
offset 
After the 413(5) 
offset 
Earned 
Wages 
$50,000 
$31,200 
(not 
working) 
(not 
working) 
PTD Benefits 
$0 
$0 
$20,540 
($395/wk.) 
$13,940 
($268/wk.) 
SSRI Benefits 
$0 
$0 
$13,200 
($l,100/mo.) 
$13,200 
($1,100/mo.) 
SSDI 
Benefits 
$0 
$0 
$0 
$0 
$50,000 
$31,200 
$33,740 
$27,140 
See Stipulation and Clarification of Factual Record (Addendum 2 hereto). 
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It is important to note that the numbers set out in Table A differ in meaningful 
ways from the numbers presented in Petitioner's Brief. First, at the time Merrill was 
granted PTD benefits in 2001, Merrill was earning $31,200, not the $50,000 per year 
represented in Petitioner's Brief. Pet. Br. at 19-20; Merrill v. Vermax, Utah Labor 
Comm'n Nos. 2003280, 2003281 at 10 (Apr. 30, 2004). At that time, Merrill was 
receiving a lower hourly wage rate because the May 14, 1998 injury had limited his 
ability to work effectively. Second, Merrill also suggests that he received SSDI, see Pet. 
Br. at 20, which he earlier acknowledged was not the case. Merrill Depo. at 72:18-73:12. 
Finally, Table A clarifies that the major reduction in Merrill's income from its 1998 peak 
occurred not as the result of any offset related to retirement, but because the May 14, 
1998 injury significantly reduced his earning power before he filed for workers 
compensation benefits in 2001. 
IV, THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
The Court of Appeals reviewed § 413(5) under the rational basis standard of 
review appropriate for equal protection challenges to statutes that do not classify based 
on a suspect class. Merrill v. Labor Comm'n., 2007 UT App 214, ^ 10, 163 P.3d 741. It 
upheld § 413(5), rejecting Merrill's contention that it was irrational because there was no 
duplication of benefits, stating that it was "reasonable for the legislature to target sixty-
five-year-old recipients of workers' compensation disability benefits who also receive 
social security retirement benefits because those individuals receive overlapping wage 
replacement awards for one lost wage." Id. ^ f 19. Noting that multiple "[s]tates that have 
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rejected equal protection challenges to state workers' compensation coordination of 
benefits provisions like section 413(5)/" id f^ 15, the court concluded that § 413(5) was a 
reasonable means of furthering two legitimate objectives: (1) to "assure employees 
adequate recovery for wages lost due to disability but also avoid duplication in benefits 
by reducing workers' compensation awards once workers also begin receiving social 
security retirement payments"; and (2) to "reduce the cost of workers' compensation 
insurance premiums for employers." ldL^| 18. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The decision whether and to what extent to coordinate Social Security and workers 
compensation benefits is fundamentally a question of legislative policy. The United 
States Congress enacted its approach to the overlap in these two schemes in § 424(a) of 
the Social Security Act. The Utah legislature implemented its approach to the 
overlapping benefit problem in § 413(5). The wisdom of these offsets is not a matter for 
judicial second-guessing under the guise of constitutional review. 
Merrill challenges § 413(5) under state and federal Equal Protection principles, 
arguing (1) that the statute purportedly discriminates on the basis of age; and (2) that 
there is no legitimate purpose that is reasonably advanced by this provision. Both 
arguments fail. Merrill ignores the broad deference afforded to legislative policy 
judgments like those inherent in § 413(5). He also mischaracterizes the purpose and 
function of the statute. Section 413(5) does not classify or discriminate on the basis of 
age, and it is reasonably aimed at advancing legitimate governmental interests—to 
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coordinate benefits under two parallel wage-replacement systems and to protect the fiscal 
integrity of the workers compensation system. 
Under a proper understanding of the statute and the governing deferential 
standards of review, Merrill's challenge fails. The legislature made a reasonable policy 
judgment that an SSRI offset is a reasonable accommodation of the important, 
countervailing interests at stake in determining an appropriate level of workers 
compensation benefits. Section 413(5) does not discriminate on the basis of age or 
disability, and it reasonably advances the legislature's legitimate objective of preserving 
an economical workers compensation system by limiting the availability of overlapping 
benefits. Thus, and in accordance with extensive precedent in other jurisdictions, this 
Court should reject Merrill's constitutional challenge to § 413(5). 
Merrill cites a handful of cases from other jurisdictions in support of his equal 
protection arguments. Those decisions are irreconcilable with the governing standard of 
scrutiny, however, and/or are distinguishable from this case in a number or respects. 
ARGUMENT 
Merrill expressly concedes that § 413(5) "does not infringe upon a fundamental 
right or create suspect classifications." Pet. Br. at 13. He also acknowledges that he 
bears the heavy burden of establishing that there is no "rational basis" for the statue 
(under the federal articulation of the standard) or that there is no "reasonable 
relationship" between the statutory classification and a legitimate governmental objective 
(under the state standard). Id This case can easily be decided—and the statute upheld— 
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on a showing of the ample "rational55 and "reasonable" bases for the Utah legislature's 
decision to coordinate the wage-replacement benefits available under the Workers 
Compensation Act with the parallel benefits available under the Social Security Act. 
Those bases are elaborated in Section II below. 
Before addressing those points, however, it is important to underscore a threshold 
flaw in Merrill's argument: § 413(5) manifestly does not involve "age based 
discrimination." Pet. Br. at 13, 20. Merrill has styled this case as a challenge to "age-
based discrimination" under the Equal Protection Clause. This Court granted certiorari 
on the basis of that characterization of the case. Merrill v. Utah Labor Comm'n, Case 
No. 20070584 (Dec. 4, 2007). Properly understood, however, § 413(5) does not 
discriminate against or classify anyone on the basis of age. As explained in detail in 
Section I below, the impact of the § 413(5) offset depends (1) on a worker's eligibility for 
and receipt of SSRI benefits, (2) on his income, and (3) on the timing of his accident. 
I. SECTION 413(5) DOES NOT DISCRIMINATE ON THE BASIS OF AGE. 
Under well-settled case law, Equal Protection principles proscribe arbitrary or 
irrational discrimination of two types: (a) explicit discrimination on the face of a statute; 
or (b) intentional, purposeful discrimination in the enactment or application of a facially 
neutral statute. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546 (1999).2 This case involves 
This Court has stated that the federal and state clauses "embody the same general 
principle," while also acknowledging that differences in language and context might 
ultimately "lead to a different result" in some circumstances. Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 
661, 669 (Utah 1984). Because petitioner's arguments in this case "do not distinguish 
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neither express, facial discrimination on the basis of age nor intentional discrimination 
motivated by animus against the aged. There accordingly is no age discrimination that is 
cognizable under the Equal Protection or Uniform Operation of Laws Clauses. 
Moreover, and in any event, even age-based classifications are not "suspect/' and they 
are subject only to rational basis review. 
A, Section 413(5) Does Not Facially Discriminate on the Basis of Age. 
When a "classification" under a statute is "explicit, no inquiry into legislative 
purpose is necessary." Hunt, 526 U.S. at 546. Thus, one method of establishing 
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause is to identify an express classification 
on the face of the statute. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976). If § 413(5) 
expressly reduced benefits for all workers over a certain age, for example, the statute 
could be said to discriminate facially on the basis of age. There is no facial 
discrimination, however, if there is only a "disproportionate impact" in the sense that 
many older workers suffer a loss of wage-replacement benefits. See Id. at 239 (a law 
does not classify on the basis of race simply "because it has a racially disproportionate 
impact"). 
Merrill asserts that § 413(5) "differentiates] between permanent total disability 
benefit recipients who are older than age 65 and those who are younger," Pet. Br. at 14, 
but that's not at all how the statute works. Section 413(5) contains no age-based 
between the two" clauses, this brief follows this Court's lead in treating the federal and 
state standards as essentially identical. Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 
816, 820 (Utah 1991). 
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classification on its face. First, not all older workers suffer a reduction in their wage-
replacement benefits under the statute. As explained below, some injured workers 
(specifically, relatively low-income workers) will receive an increase in their take-home 
benefits on the date the § 413(5) offset is triggered. Second, there is no specific age at 
which the § 413(5) offset is invoked. The timing of the impact of § 413(5) depends on 
the date of the worker's injury and on his eligibility for SSRI benefits. Thus, § 413(5) 
does not make any facial classification on the basis of age, since not all older workers 
suffer a net loss in benefits and the impact on those who do is dictated by considerations 
other than age. 
1. Some older workers receive an increase in take-home benefits when § 
413(5) is invoked. 
Section 413(5) impacts each injured worker differently. Some older workers 
actually receive greater wage-replacement benefits after the § 413(5) offset is triggered. 
Consider the two workers in the following table, one earning a $50,000 salary and the 
other a $25,000 salary. 
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Table B3 
Date of Birth 
Date of Injury 
Income at Injury 
Full PTD Benefits 
Full SSDI Benefits 
Full SSRI Benefits 
Income Before § 413(5) Offset 
Income After § 413(5) Offset 
Worker 1 
January 2, 1950 
January 2, 2008 
$50,000 
$29,352 ($2,446/month) 
$16,524 ($1,377/month) 
$16,128 ($l,344/month) 
$39,996 ($3,333/month) 
$37,416 ($3,118/month) 
Worker 2 
January 2, 1950 
January 2,2008 
$25,000 
$16,608 ($l,384/month) 
$10,728 ($894/month) 
$10,524 ($877/month) 
$20,004 ($1,667/month) 
$21,870 ($l,823/month) 
The only difference between the two workers in the table is their income. Before 
retirement age, both workers receive a combination of PTD workers compensation 
benefits and SSDL After retirement age, both workers receive a combination of PTD and 
SSRI. But note that only Worker 1 (the higher-income worker) is worse off after the § 
413(5) offset is invoked. Worker 1 goes from $3,333 in monthly wage-replacement 
Table B was compiled using the Social Security Administration's Quick Calculator, 
available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/quickcalc/index.html. Using this online 
calculator, SSDI and SSRI benefits for each worker were calculated as follows: (1) input 
the date of birth; (2) leave the "current earnings" field blank (based on the assumption 
that the hypothetical injury precludes any future earned income); (3) enter "2007" as the 
last year for covered earnings and either $50,000 or $25,000 as the earnings amount; (4) 
leave the "today's dollars" option selected. PTD benefits were calculated in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(2) and using the average weekly compensation for 
permanent total disability for the year beginning July 1, 2007 and ending July 1, 2008. 
See Quick Reference Grid 2007, available at 
http://laborcommission.utah.gov/IndustrialAccidents 
/Publications/pdfs/QUICK%20REFERENCE%20GRID%202007.pdf (last accessed: Feb. 
18, 2008). Because two-thirds of $50,000 exceeds the maximum weekly compensation 
of $565, Worker l's PTD benefits were capped at $565 per week (or $29,352 per year). 
Worker 2's PTD benefits were calculated as two-thirds of his weekly wage at the time of 
injury. 
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benefits before § 413(5) is invoked to $3,118 thereafter, while Worker 2 goes from 
$1,667 in monthly benefits to $1,823 after the § 413(5) offset is triggered. 
Table B highlights a fundamental flaw in Merrill's argument: It is simply 
inaccurate to say that the "only factor that triggers" a net reduction under § 413(5) "is the 
person's age." Pet. Br. at 19. In the case of Workers 1 and 2, the "only" distinguishing 
factor is income, not age. And although the two workers are the same age, there is no 
reduction for Worker 2, who is actually better off under § 413(5) than he is under § 424 
of the Social Security Act. 
The reason for this is that the § 424 offset has a greater impact than the § 413(5) 
offset on lower-income workers, as the following table illustrates: 
Table B.l 
Full PTD + SSDI Benefits 
Full PTD + SSRI Benefits 
ACE 
80% ACE Cap 
Reduction of PTD + SSDI 
by § 424 
[Reduction of PTD + SSRI 
1 by § 413(5) 
Worker 1 ($50,000) 
$45,876 ($3,823/month) 
$45,480 ($3,790/month) 
$4,167/month 
$3,333/month 
-$490/month 
(to $3,333/month) 
-$672/month 
(to$3,118/month) 
Worker 2 ($25,000) 
$27,336 ($2,278/month) 
$27,132 ($2,261/month) 
$2,083/month 
$l,667/month 
-$611/month 
(to $1,667/month) 
-$438/month 
(to %1,823/month) 
Under § 424, Worker 1 is subject to a relatively small reduction in SSDI benefits because 
his ACE figure is high.4 Yet, at retirement age, when Worker l 's SSDI benefits are 
4
 Section 424 caps PTD and SSDI benefits at 80 percent of the worker's ACE. Thus, if 
the sum of PTD and SSDI benefits exceeds 80 percent of the worker's ACE, then SSDI 
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converted to SSRI benefits, he will be subject to a significant reduction in PTD benefits 
under § 413(5)—in the amount of 50% of his SSRI benefits. Since Worker l's § 424 
offset is small compared to his § 413(5) offset, Worker 1 is worse off when he reaches 
Social Security retirement age. 
But this impact is because of his income, not his age, as a comparison with 
Worker 2 illustrates. Worker 2 is subject to a significant reduction in SSDI benefits 
under § 424 given his lower ACE. Worker 2 is entitled to $894 in full SSDI benefits, but 
receives only $283 under § 424—a net reduction of $611 in monthly benefits under § 
424. Yet, at full retirement age, when Worker 2 becomes eligible for SSRI, his offset 
(now under § 413(5)) is less: his PTD benefits are reduced by $438 (50% of his SSRI 
benefits of $877). Since the § 413(5) offset is less than the § 424 offset, Worker 2 is 
actually better off when he reaches normal Social Security retirement age. 
2. The impact of § 413(5) is dictated by factors other than age. 
Even for workers (like Merrill) who experience a loss of wage-replacement 
benefits under § 413(5), the timing of that loss is dictated by factors other than age. For 
benefits are reduced until the 80 percent figure is reached. 42 USC § 424(a). Federal 
regulations define a person's ACE as the highest number of any of the following: (1) the 
average monthly wage used for computing the individual's SSDI benefits; (2) 1/60 of the 
sum of the individual's yearly earnings during the five-year period in which he earned the 
most; or (3) 1/12 of the individual's greatest yearly earnings for the year the individuals 
was injured or any of the 5 years preceding the year of injury. 20 C.F.R. 404.408. For 
our illustrations, we used $50,000/$25,000 as the figures for calculating the disability 
benefits and assumed that this income figure was the greatest annual salary of each 
worker's career. We therefore used $50,000/$25,000 as the ACE for our hypothetical 
workers. 
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example, § 413(5) is never invoked until the expiration of a base period of 312 weeks (six 
years), during which the injured worker is entitled to receive both full PTD benefits and 
SSRI benefits, without any reduction or offset. Consider the two workers in the table 
below, one like Worker 1 in Table B who suffers an injury at age 58 and the other who 
suffers an injury at age 66: 
Table C5 
Date of Birth 
Date Injured 
Income at Injury 
Full PTD Benefits 
Full SSDI Benefits 
Full SSRI Benefits 
Income at Retirement Age 
Age § 413(5) Offset 
Effective 
Worker 1 
January 2, 1950 
January 2, 2008 
$50,000 
$29,352 ($2,446/month) 
$16,524 ($1,377/month) 
$16,128 ($l,S44/month) 
$37,416 ($3,118/month) 
66 
Worker 3 
January 2, 1942 
January 2, 2008 
$50,000 
$29,352 ($2,446/month) 
(not eligible) 
$17,292 ($1,441/month) 
$46,644 ($3,887/month) 
71 (312 weeks after injury) 
These two workers are identical except that Worker 3's injury occurs right before 
his 66th birthday. While Worker 1 does see a reduction in his PTS and SSRI benefits at 
normal retirement age due to § 413(5), Worker 3 is entitled to full, unreduced PTD and 
SSRI benefits of $46,644 until he is 71. Only then will his PTD benefits be reduced by 
5
 The numbers in Table C were calculated using the Social Security Online Quick 
Calculator available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/quickcalc/index.html. The SSDI and 
SSRI numbers were calculated as follows: (1) enter the applicable birth date; (2) leave the 
"current earnings" field blank; (3) enter "2007" as the last earnings year and "$50000" as 
the last earnings amount; and (4) leave the "today's dollars" option selected. 
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50% of his SSRI benefits under § 413(5). Thus, Worker 3 shows that the impact of 
§413(5) also depends on the timing of the injury and not merely on age. 
Another non-age-based factor is the eligibility of the worker for SSRI. Consider 
two more workers, one like Worker 1 in Table B and the other who is ineligible for SSRI: 
Table D6 
Date of Birth 
Date Injured 
SS Credits Earned 
Income at Injury 
Full PTD Benefits 
Full SSDI Benefits 
Full SSRI Benefits 
Income Before § 413(5) 
Offset 
Income After § 413(5) Offset 
Worker 1 
January 2, 1950 
January 2, 2008 
160 
$50,000 
$29,352 ($2,446/month) 
$16,524 ($1,377/month) 
$16,128 ($l,344/month) 
$39,996 ($3,333/month) 
$37,416 ($3,118/month) 
Worker 4 
January 2, 1979 
January 2, 2008 
36 
$25,000 
$13,988 ($1,166/month) 
(not eligible) 
(not eligible) 
$13,,988 ($1,1'66/month) 
$13,988 ($1,166/month) 
Worker 4 is unaffected by any of the offset provisions since he is ineligible to receive any 
Social Security benefits. Ineligible workers would include those like Worker 4 who have 
not worked in "covered employment" for a sufficient period of time. As Table D 
6
 The numbers for the workers in Table D were generated using the Social Security 
Online Quick Calculator, which is available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/quickcalc 
/index.html. The SSDI and SSRI benefits were calculated as follows: (1) enter the 
applicable birth date; (2) leave the "earnings in the current year" field blank; (3) enter 
2007 as the last year of covered earnings and either $50000 or $25000 as the amount of 
earnings; (4) leave the "today's dollars" option selected. For the 1979 worker, the 
estimated number of credits earned appears on the page that loads immediately after 
clicking the "Submit Request" button. For the 1950 worker, after clicking on the 
"Submit Request" button, click on the "See the earnings we used" button and scroll all 
the way to the bottom of the page for an estimate of credits earned. 
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indicates, the impact of § 413(5) is determined by work history and eligibility for SSRI, 
not by age. 
3. The only age-based classification is in the award of SSRI benefits, 
which Merrill does not and cannot challenge. 
It is true that all individuals potentially affected by § 413(5) are over the age of 65 
(or age 62, in the case of receipt of reduced early retirement benefits). But that is not 
because this statute discriminates against injured workers on the basis of age. Instead, it 
is because the underlying benefit at issue (SSRI) is afforded on the basis of age (and other 
eligibility criteria). In other words, the age-based "classification" is in the threshold 
decision to make SSRI benefits available only to older workers. Merrill is hardly 
challenging that classification, however; he happily accepts the Social Security payment 
made available to him on the basis (among other things) of his age, and he is in no 
position to quarrel with the "discrimination" inherent in a Social Security program that 
awards benefits only to older workers. 
Workers affected by § 413(5) must accept as a given that the statute affects only a 
class of workers who are 65 or older and who are receiving SSRI benefits. The question 
before the Court is not whether that age-based classification (which is to older workers' 
benefit) is unconstitutional, but whether there is a further sub-classification in § 413(5) 
that runs afoul of Equal Protection principles. As a threshold matter, the Court should 
acknowledge that § 413(5) simply does not classify or discriminate on the basis of age. 
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B. Section 413(5) Was Not Motivated by Any Age-Discriminatory Purpose. 
"A facially neutral law" discriminates "only if it can be proved that the law was 
'motivated by'95 some arbitrary, irrational "'purpose or object/" or "if it is 'unexplainable 
on'" other rational grounds. Hunt, 526 U.S. at 546 (articulating this standard in a case 
involving a suspect race classification). In other words, proof of a "disproportionate 
impact" on a group or class is insufficient to establish discrimination under the Equal 
Protection Clause. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
265 (1977). "Proof of... discriminatory intent or purpose is required . . . . " Id. 
"Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor 
demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may 
be available." Id at 266. A "clear pattern" in the impact of a law may indicate that it is 
"unexplainable on [neutral, rational] grounds." Id. Alternatively, the "historical 
background" of the official action may be another "evidentiary source, particularly if it 
reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes." Id at 267. "The 
specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision ... may shed some light 
on the decisionmaker's purposes," and the "legislative ... history may be highly 
relevant," as "where there are contemporary statements by members of the 
decisionmaking body" indicating discriminatory intent. Id at 267-68. 
In this case, there is no reason to suspect "discriminatory intent" in the enactment 
of § 413(5). The "historical background" and "sequence of events leading up to the 
challenged decision" confirm that the Utah legislature's intent was neutral and not based 
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on animus against the aged. Specifically, as noted above, the legislature enacted § 413(5) 
as a response to concerns about the rising costs and insurance premiums associated with 
workers compensation insurance. H.R... Floor Debate, 47th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 
16, 1988). The offset for SSRI benefits was seen as a way to limit the cost of workers 
compensation coverage without imposing an undue burden on injured workers. Id. At no 
point in the background or history of the legislation was there ever any shred of any 
discriminatory animus against older workers. 
Instead, the whole point was to coordinate workers compensation benefits with the 
retirement benefits that older workers might receive under the Social Security Act. 
Affirmative steps were taken to avoid arbitrary discrimination against older workers 
simply on the basis of their age, in that the offset is triggered only by receipt of SSRI 
benefits (not mere attainment of a certain age), and the offset does not apply until after a 
base period of 312 weeks. 
C. Even Age-Based Classifications are Subject to Rational Basis Review 
In a sense, the above analysis is much ado about nothing (or at least very little), 
since even age-based classifications are not "suspect," and they are thus subject only to 
rational basis review. The United States Supreme Court "has said repeatedly that age is 
not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 
U.S. 452, 470 (1991). Thus, in cases involving governmental classification on the basis 
of age, the deferential "rational basis" standard applies. Id. Under this standard, a 
legislative classification survives "if it is 'rationally related to furthering a legitimate state 
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interest.5" Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (quoting Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. 
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976)). 
This Court's case law is to the same effect. In Purdie v. University of Utah, 584 
P.2d 831, 833 (Utah 1978), this Court rejected as "unpersuasive" the argument that "age 
is an inherently suspect classification." See also State v. Bell 785 P.2d 390, 399 (Utah 
1989) ("[A]ge has not been determined to be a suspect classification.55). Thus, under the 
Utah Constitution, the standard of review is highly deferential. Where there is no suspect 
classification under the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause, the standard is "'(1) whether 
the classification is reasonable, (2) whether the legislative objectives are legitimate, and 
(3) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the two.555 Peterson v. Coca-Cola 
USA, 2002 UT 42,1J23, 48 P.3d 941 (quoting Ryan v. Gold Cross Servs., Inc., 903 P.2d 
423, 426 (Utah 1995)). Thus, even if § 413(5) were somehow deemed to discriminate on 
the basis of age, the standard of scrutiny would be the same. 
II. SECTION 413(5) IS RATIONALLY RELATED TO LEGITIMATE STATE 
INTERESTS. 
Under the federal rational basis standard, matters concerning the wisdom of 
legislative policy judgments are "to be 'fixed only by the people acting through their 
elected representatives.'" Vance, 440 U.S. at 102 (quoting Firemen v. Chicago, R.I. & 
P.R. Co., 393 U.S. 129, 138 (1968)). This standard anticipates that "even improvident 
decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial 
intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political 
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branch has acted." Id at 97. Judicial deference is appropriate "[e]\en if the 
classification involved ... is to some extent both underinclusive and overinclusive," such 
that "the line drawn [by the legislature] is imperfect" and "'not made with mathematical 
nicety.'" Id. at 108 (citations omitted). Deference is particularly substantial in matters of 
economic regulation. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 884 (1985) 
("heavy burden" applies to challenges to "local economic regulation"). 
Again, this Court's case law is to the same effect. In the case of economic 
regulation, the Utah courts give "broad deference to the legislature when scrutinizing the 
reasonableness of its classifications and their relationship to legitimate legislative 
purposes." Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989). 
"[I]t is not [the courts'] function to defend the merits, desirability, or rationality of 
legislative action. Rather, [the judicial] function is to examine the reasonableness of the 
classification in light of legislative objectives." Ryan v. Gold Cross Servs., Inc., 903 
P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1995). Moreover, deference to legislative classifications is not 
confined to the purposes expressly identified by the legislature; legislative action is 
sustained "if there are any conceivable facts that would justify the action." Id. at 427. 
Section 413(5) easily survives under these deferential standards. Section 413(5) is 
reasonably related to at least two legitimate governmental interests: (a) the coordination 
of overlapping wage-replacement benefits; and (b) the preservation of the fiscal integrity 
of the workers compensation system. 
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A. § 413(5) Reasonably Advances the Goal of Limiting Overlapping Benefits. 
This Court has expressly endorsed the legitimacy of the goal of avoiding "double 
recovery" under the Workers Compensation Act and the reasonableness of coordination 
of benefits provisions in advancing that goal See Esquivel v. Labor Comm'n., 2000 UT 
66 at f 23. In Esquivel this Court explained that the coordination provision in Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5) advances the important goal of avoidance of "[djouble 
recovery for injuries or death sustained in conjunction with an accident covered by 
workers' compensation." 
Section 413(5) reasonably advances a similarly legitimate objective. It provides 
for a limited (50%) offset for wage-replacement benefits received under the Social 
Security retirement program, after a 312-week base period. Because both PTD benefits 
and SSRI benefits are aimed (at least in part) at protecting against wage loss, the Utah 
legislature adopted § 413(5) in an attempt to coordinate these benefits and reduce the 
overlap between the two systems. 
Case law in other jurisdictions confirms the reasonableness of this approach. See 
Brown v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 599 P.2d 1031, 1036 (Kan. 1979) (Offset 
provision "prevents] a duplication of benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act 
and the Social Security Act," thus "plac[ing] the worker in the same position as fellow 
workers who have retired and are drawing old age social security benefits"); Keith v. 
Hopple Plastics, 178 S.W.3d 463, 466-67 (Ky. 2005) ("coordinating systems of wage-
loss protection by requiring an offset for duplicative income replacement benefits or 
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placing a ceiling on combined benefits [is] viewed widely as being sound public policy"); 
John Tobin's Case, 675 N.E.2d at 253 (Massachusetts "coordination provision" 
"prevents] the stacking of benefits derived from statutory ... schemes designed to serve 
a common purpose," and alleviates "the burden on employers"); Harris v. Dept. of Labor 
and Inds., 843 P.2d 1056, 1064-66 (Wash. 1993) (upholding offset provision as 
reasonably advancing goals of "avoiding duplication in benefits or 'double-dipping'" and 
"[s]aving money for the state fund and reducing industrial insurance premiums"); Vogel 
v. Wells Fargo Guard Servs., 937 S.W.2d 856, 858-59 (Tenn. 1996) ("joinpng] other 
jurisdictions in applying the rational basis test" upholding a similar statute as "rationally 
related to the goal of assuring that employees have an adequate recovery"). 
Merrill offers two principal objections to the rationality of this objective of § 
413(5): (1) that there is no duplication of benefits because SSRI benefits are not wage 
replacement benefits; and (2) that that § 413(5) does not call for any offset or 
coordination with other retirement benefits. Both arguments fail. 
1. There is at least some overlap (even if not precise "duplication") 
between workers compensation and Social Security. 
Merrill's first argument is thoroughly undermined by the stated purpose of the 
OASDI program. See Overview of Social Security Administration, http://www.ssa.gov/ 
finance/2006/Overview.pdf, (last accessed: Feb. 18, 2008) (stating that SSRI "provides 
... protection against the loss of earnings due to retirement," and is "intended to replace a 
portion of... lost earnings"). It also ignores the undeniable fact that u[t]he monthly 
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benefit amount to which an individual (or qualifying survivors) may become entitled ... 
is based on the individual's taxable earnings during his or her lifetime." Id. 
As the leading treatise on workers compensation explains, workers compensation 
and Social Security are "designed to restore the worker a portion ... of wages lost" due to 
two causes of wage-loss: physical disability and old age. Larson's Workers' 
Compensation Law § 157-01 (2006). "The crucial operative fact is that of wage loss; the 
cause of the wage loss merely dictates the category of legislation applicable. [I]f a 
worker undergoes a period of wage loss due to [both] conditions, it does not follow that 
he or she should receive [two] sets of benefits simultaneously.... The worker is 
experiencing only one wage loss and, in any logical system, should receive only one 
wage-loss benefit." Id 
The overlap between the two wage-replacement benefits is not erased by the fact 
that each is triggered by a different event. Thus, Merrill correctly states that workers 
compensation benefits "are provided to compensate injured workers for loss of income 
resulting from work-related injuries," while SSRI benefits "are provided to persons 
regardless of injury so long as the recipient has reached the statutory age." Pet. Br. at 23. 
But this difference in the triggering event does not erase the essential overlap in 
coverage. Both workers compensation and SSRI are aimed at providing limited 
protection against wage loss. 
For many older workers who have suffered a workplace injury, the triggering 
event becomes irrelevant because the worker's age eventually overtakes the workplace 
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injury as the proximate cause of the wage loss. Eventually, most workers (by choice or 
due to the effects of old age) reach a point at which they choose to stop working. At 
whatever age that happens, there would certainly be an overlap in benefits if the worker 
were granted both lifetime PTD benefits and SSRI benefits. The legislature was entitled 
to treat the Social Security retirement age as the age at which many workers would be 
expected to retire. Beyond the point at which the injured worker would have chosen to 
retire, the overlap between PTD benefits and SSRI benefits is obvious. 
It is certainly true, as Merrill notes, that older workers who have not suffered 
workplace injuries "receive their [SSRI] benefits and have the option of continuing to 
work as well to maintain their desired or needed income." Pet. Br. at 20. But that in no 
way dispels the rationality of the § 413(5) offset. Given Merrill's concern, the legislature 
could consider three possible options: (1) a subjective rule permitting an injured worker 
to assert that he would have chosen to work beyond the usual retirement age; (2) an 
objective rule entitling all injured workers to receive full PTD benefits beyond retirement 
age and until death, assuming that they would continue to work past retirement age and 
earn wages while collecting SSRI; and (3) an objective rule (as in § 413(5)) offsetting 
part of SSRI benefits against all injured workers' PTD benefits, based on the assumption 
n 
At most, the difference in the two triggering events might be said to suggest that there is 
no precise "duplication" in coverage. But exact duplication is not the question. The 
legitimate goal of the statute is to coordinate two parallel provisions that have some 
overlap—even if not precise duplication. 
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that they would not continue to work past retirement age and thus would not earn wages 
while collecting SSRL 
The first option is entirely unworkable. A subjective rule permitting a worker to 
argue that he would have chosen to work beyond retirement age would be an invitation 
for abuse. Any worker could plausibly assert that he would have chosen to work past age 
65 but for his injury, and the employer would be hard-pressed to disprove such a 
hypothetical assertion. 
Thus, the legislature's preference for an objective rule is surely reasonable. As the 
Supreme Court explained in upholding a mandatory Foreign Service retirement rule 
against an equal protection attack in Vance, legislative over-generalizations are 
permissible because they are "rationally related to the secondary objective of legislative 
convenience." 440 U.S. at 109 (explaining that in adopting an over-generalized 
mandatory retirement rule, "Congress chose not to examine exactly which employees are 
likely to serve long enough in important enough positions in demanding enough locales 
to warrant mandatory early retirement"). 
The remaining question is whether there is a rational basis for choosing option (3) 
(§ 413(5)) over option (2) (lifetime PTD benefits never offset by SSRI benefits). That 
choice was surely a rational one. This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that many 
older workers (injured or not) eventually cease working before death. In light of that 
undeniable fact, the legislature was entitled to prefer option (3) over option (2). 
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Both options will result in some degree of over-generalization. Under option (3), 
as Merrill notes, some injured workers will be under-compensated as a result of their 
injury because they would have chosen to work beyond retirement age if they had not 
been injured. Yet option (2) results in over-compensation—for all injured workers who 
would have chosen to retire if they had not been injured. The Utah legislature decided 
that the over-compensation concern was the greater evil, and thus it chose option (3). 
Merrill cannot possibly carry his burden of establishing the irrationality of that 
choice—of showing that the undercompensation inherent in option (3) is a bigger 
problem than the over-compensation inherent in option (2). Indeed, any such a showing 
would be inadequate in any event, since "a State 'does not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect.'" Gregory, 501 
U.S. at 473 (quoting Murgia, 427 U.S. at 316). The U.S. Supreme Court's analysis in the 
Gregory case is instructive. In upholding Missouri's mandatory judicial retirement rule, 
the Gregory Court acknowledged that such a requirement, "like all legal classifications, is 
founded on a generalization": "It is far from true that all judges suffer significant 
deterioration in performance at age 70. It is probably true that most do. It may not be 
true at all." Id But that did not make the classification unconstitutional: 
"In an equal protection case of this type . . . those challenging the . . . judgment [of 
the people] must convince the court that the . . . facts on which the classification is 
apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the . . . 
decisionmaker." The people of Missouri rationally could conclude that the threat 
of deterioration at age 70 is sufficiently great, and the alternatives for removal 
sufficiently inadequate, that they will require all judges to step aside at age 70. 
This classification does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
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Id. (citations omitted). 
Section 413(5) easily survives under this standard. "It is far from true" that all 
workers retire at the Social Security retirement age. "It is probably true" that many do. 
"It may not be true at all." But Merrill's challenge can succeed only if he can establish 
that the Utah legislature "could not reasonably ... conceive[]" that many workers will 
choose to retire at the Social Security retirement age and that "the alternatives" to a § 
413(5) offset are "inadequate." This was surely within the realm of rationality. 
A similar approach is dictated by this Court's decision in Greenwood v. City of 
North Salt Lake. In that case, the Court upheld a City ordinance imposing animal control 
restrictions on pit bulls. Plaintiffs challenged the ordinance as "overbroad," since "not all 
pit bulls are dangerous." 817 P.2d at 821. This Court acknowledged the ordinance's 
overbreadth, but nonetheless rejected plaintiffs' equal protection challenge on the ground 
that the law "reasonably furthers and is rationally related to public safety" since at least 
some (if not all) "pit bulls are dangerous animals." IdL A similar analysis is appropriate 
here: § 413(5) reasonably furthers the State's economic interests since at least some (if 
not all) older workers stop working before death, and without § 413(5) many older 
workers would be over-compensated. 
2. The absence of offsets for other retirement benefits is irrelevant 
Merrill also points out that "[t]here is no requirement in the statute for a reduction 
of PTD benefits due to the receipt of any other kind of retirement or pension benefits." 
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Pet. Br. at 12. That point is also true, but equally unavailing. As the U.S. Supreme Court 
explained in rejecting a similar challenge to the rationality of the Social Security offset 
provision, it is not within the "limited function" of the courts "to consider whether the 
legitimate purposes of [the legislature] might have been better served by applying the 
same offset to recipients of private insurance." Richardson, 404 U.S. at 84. The Utah 
legislature "need not 'strike at all evils at the same time'"; "'reform may take one step at 
a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the 
legislative mind.'" Greenwood, 817 P.2d at 821 (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of 
Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955)). 
Greenwood again is instructive. Plaintiffs in that case noted that the pit-bull 
ordinance was "underinclusive" because it did not apply to "many [other] breeds" that 
were also dangerous. 817 P.2d at 821. Yet this Court upheld the ordinance on the 
ground that the City was entitled to "remedy 'the problem which seems most acute to the 
legislative mind.'" Id. (quoting Williamson, 348 U.S. at 489). "The fact that other 
breeds which might also threaten public safety are not included in the ordinance does not 
make the law violative of equal protection." Id The same is true here: the fact that 
other retirement benefits are not included in the § 413(5) offset does not render the statute 
unconstitutional. Indeed, there is a sensible explanation for the legislature's decision to 
distinguish private retirement benefits from SSRI and workers compensation. The former 
are generally funded by the employee; the latter are employer-funded social programs 
subject to comprehensive regulation. In light of these differences, there is a reasonable 
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basis for the legislature's decision to offset SSRI but not private retirement: (1) it is 
"relatively simple to enforce the Workmen's Compensation deductions, whereas 
separating out the wage benefits from civil damage judgments, or determining who had 
received private insurance benefits, might offer administrative problems of a serious 
nature"; and (2) Social Security and workers compensation are "more arguably 
duplicative of one another" since they are both "social welfare legislation," whereas 
"[p]rivate accident or disability insurance is a private contract, frequently paid for 
entirely by the recipient." Lofty v. Richardson, 440 F.2d 1144, 1151-52 (6th Cir. 1971); 
see also Richardson, 404 U.S. at 84 (courts "have no occasion" under the Equal 
Protection Clause "to consider whether the legitimate purposes of Congress might have 
o 
been better served by applying the same offset to recipients of private insurance"). 
B. § 413(5) Reasonably Advances the Goal of Protecting the Fiscal Integrity of 
the Workers Compensation System. 
Second, § 413(5) advances an equally legitimate goal of protecting the fiscal 
integrity of Utah's workers compensation system. The legitimacy of this goal cannot be 
doubted. See Touchard v. La-Z Boy, Inc.. 2006 UT 71, ffif 12-14, 148 P.3d 945 
(workers compensation "furthers a clear public policy" of "overarching importance to the 
public"). "'The theory of workmen's compensation is based largely upon the doctrine 
O 
In fact, workers compensation coverage is paid for entirely by the employer, whereas 
Social Security is funded by equal 50% contributions by the employer and the employee. 
Thus, the 50% offset of SSRI benefits is hardly arbitrary; it is precisely parallel to the 
50% contribution the employer has made toward that benefit. That parallelism easily 
explains the rationality of § 413(5), and easily sustains its constitutionality. 
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that society itself is vitally concerned in the prompt payment of compensation to injured 
[workers] and the dependents of killed employ[ee]s.'" Reteuna v. Indus. Comm'n, 185 P. 
535, 537 (Utah 1919). 
Section 413(5) is an integral element of the legislature's comprehensive system for 
allocating a minimally appropriate level of benefits to Utah workers. In providing for a 
partial offset for SSRI benefits, the legislature reasonably decided that a perpetual award 
of PTD benefits past the usual retirement age and continuing until the worker's death was 
economically unwarranted. Inherent in that legislative policy judgment was the 
determination that perpetual PTD benefits would pose an unreasonable threat to the fiscal 
integrity of the workers compensation system. That judgment was entirely reasonable 
and is entitled to deference. 
Merrill's "constitutional" challenge is a misguided attempt to substitute his own 
subjective policy judgments for those of the legislature. Merrill believes that the § 413(5) 
offset "erodes the financial integrity of our senior citizens," and he obviously prefers the 
"old statute" under which PTD benefits "were ... set for the life of the injured worker" 
without any offset for SSRI. Pet. Br. at 11, 14-15. Such arguments are fair game in 
future lobbying efforts in the legislature, but they are not a basis for a judicial override of 
the balance struck in the current statute.9 
9
 The limited offset for Social Security benefits in § 413(5) is just one of a wide range of 
provisions that dictate the amount of the wage replacement benefit available under the 
Workers Compensation Act. If this court were to accept Merrill's invitation to question 
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III. CASE LAW IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS IS EITHER 
DISTINGUISHABLE OR IRRECONCILABLE WITH THE GOVERNING 
STANDARDS OF SCRUTINY. 
Merrill cites a handful of cases from other jurisdictions in support of his equal 
protection arguments. Pet. Br. at 23-24. Those decisions are irreconcilable with the 
governing standard of scrutiny and/or distinguishable from this case for reasons 
explained below. Indeed, although Merrill's brief leaves the impression that offset 
provisions like § 413(5) have been uniformly struck down as unconstitutional, see id, at 
22-31, courts in a number of jurisdictions, as noted above, have upheld nearly identical 
provisions against equal protection challenges like the one asserted here. These decisions 
are much more in line with the applicable standards of review under the Equal Protection 
Clause and Uniform Operation of Laws Clause, and the contrary decisions cited by 
Merrill should be rejected. 
A. Merrill's Cases Apply an Insufficiently Deferential Standard of Scrutiny 
The cases cited by Merrill all make a variation on a single unpersuasive 
argument—that workers compensation benefits and SSRI benefits do not have precisely 
the same purpose, and thus it is "irrational" to coordinate the benefits available under 
these laws. Specifically, the courts that have struck down coordination provisions 
suggest that either workers compensation benefits or SSRI benefits are not (or at least not 
the wisdom of § 413(5), that would open the door to judicial second-guessing of any of a 
number of other provisions in the Act. 
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just) wage-replacement benefits, so there is no "duplication" in a system that awards both 
sets of benefits. 
In Boan v. Richardson, 482 S.E.2d 162 (W.Va. 1996), for example, the West 
Virginia Supreme Court asserted that the workers compensation system was "more than 
simply a wage replacement system," since it "stand[]s in lieu of a myriad of damage 
elements recognized in the tort system that are not measurable by wages earned or the 
average wages in the State." Id at 550-51. Because workers compensation benefits are 
not purely wage-replacement benefits, the Boan Court concluded that there was a "lack of 
commonality" with the benefits available under the Social Security act, which in its view 
"sapfped the West Virginia statute] of rationality, assuming its purpose to be the 
avoidance of double-dipping or duplication of benefits." Id. at 551. 
The Florida Court of Appeals offered a converse point in Sasso v. Ram Property 
Management, 431 So.2d 204 (Fla. App. 1983). Because a worker can continue to work 
while receiving SSRI benefits, the Sasso court asserted that SSRI benefits, "although 
intended to assist a worker in his retirement, have evolved into a benefit that is more 
attributable to advanced years rather than retirement wage-loss." LI at 219. Thus, the 
Court concluded that the Florida offset statute was not rationally related to the goal of 
avoiding duplication of benefits (although it ultimately upheld the statute on alternative 
grounds that are equally applicable here—as explained below). Id at 220, 224. 
The analysis in these opinions is unavailing, as it ultimately rests on a 
misunderstanding of the nature of workers compensation and SSRI benefits as well as the 
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application of a standard of scrutiny that is incompatible with controlling precedent from 
this and the U.S. Supreme Court. For reasons explained below, the Utah legislature acted 
reasonably in finding some degree of overlap in the two wage-replacement schemes at 
issue. Moreover, there is an alternative rational basis for the legislature's decision to 
offset a portion of SSRI benefits against PTD benefits: the protection of the fiscal 
integrity of the workers compensation system. 
1. There is at least some overlap in PTD benefits and OASI benefits. 
Despite the facile rejection of this point in the decisions cited above, the Utah 
legislature was well within the bounds of rationality in finding that both the workers 
compensation and Social Security systems have a wage-replacement component. 
Larson 's Workers' Compensation Law § 157-01 (2006). Under the rational basis or 
deferential standard of review, the point that workers compensation is not solely a wage 
replacement program does not mean that it is irrational for the legislature to use receipt of 
another type of wage replacement (SSRI) as the trigger for an offset. 
Merrill's characterization of workers compensation benefits—especially those 
paid out in permanent total disability cases—as non-wage replacement benefits is belied 
by common sense and prior case law from Utah courts. Workers compensation benefits 
paid to the permanently disabled are benefits paid to those who, by definition, will no 
longer be able to earn a wage. The benefits are calculated on a weekly basis and are 
usually paid out over time like paychecks, rather than in a lump sum like tort damages. 
Although Merrill is correct in asserting that the workers compensation system operates as 
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a "substitute for access to the courts for civil redress under the common law tort system/' 
Pet. Br. at 27, this by no means indicates that workers compensation benefits are not part 
of a wage replacement program. 
Prior to the advent of the workers compensation system, compensation for lost 
wages due to injury on the job was certainly one of the primary damages sought by 
injured employees who brought tort claims against their employers. The Workers 
Compensation Act created an administrative system as a substitute for the uncertain 
process of suit for lost wages and other damages. See Gunderson v. May Dept. Stores 
Co., 955 P.2d 346, 349 (Utah 1998). Considering that wage replacement was a major 
part of the tort system that the workers compensation system replaced, Merrill simply 
cannot escape the reality that workers compensation benefits are wage replacement 
benefits. Finally, Utah courts have already acknowledged that replacement of lost wages 
is one of the main functions of the workers compensation system. See LPI Servs. v. 
Labor Comm'iu 2007 UT App 375, ^  20, 173 P.3d 858 (citing Reteuna v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 185 P. 535, 537 (Utah 1919)). 
Even if workers compensation benefits are not exclusively aimed at replacing 
wages, the workers compensation system is at least partially a wage replacement system. 
See Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 157-01 (2006); LPI Servs., 2007 UT App ^ 
20. The question of the appropriate amount of offset or coordination between two 
programs that have at least some common goals is fundamentally a legislative policy 
choice. Although Merrill dresses his argument in constitutional garb, his case boils down 
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to a request that this Court second-guess an economic policy judgment made by the state 
legislature that implicates no fundamental right or suspect class—something this Court 
has repeatedly said is not appropriate: 
Due respect for the legislative prerogative in lawmaking requires that the judiciary 
not interfere with enactments of the Legislature where disagreement is founded 
only on policy considerations and the legislative scheme employs reasonable 
means to effectuate a legitimate objective. In matters not affecting fundamental 
rights, the prerogative of the legislative branch is broad and must by necessity be 
so if government is to be by the people through their elected representatives and 
not by judges. 
Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233, 237 (Utah 1979). 
A legislative classification need not be perfect to be upheld under rational basis or 
deferential review. Even if, at the margins, a particular classification is somewhat under-
or over-inclusive, it will nevertheless be upheld so long as it appears to be a "reasonable 
attempt to achieve the legitimate government ends." Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah 
v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 644 (Utah 1989). To hold otherwise would be to impermissibly 
constrain the legislature's policymaking role: 
Legislative enactments that are basically economic in nature rarely affect all 
persons equally. Such enactments require classifications which necessarily reflect 
legislative judgments which accord various weights to various shadings of 
differences in human affairs. Razor-thin distinctions which are entirely devoid of 
some arbitrariness are rarely, if ever, possible. The rationality of the classifications 
is a matter of degree. If courts were to insist upon logical precision in creating 
classifications not consistent with the nature of the problem to be addressed, 
legislative power would be seriously crippled. 
Blue Cross, 779 P.2d at 644-45 (Utah 1989). 
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Merrill also errs in contending that SSRI benefits are not wage replacement 
benefits. See Pet. Br. at 28-29. His argument rests on reasoning set out by the Sasso 
court: that SSRI benefits are not wage replacement benefits because an eligible person 
may still receive SSRI benefits even if they choose to continue to work after their date of 
eligibility. The Sasso court concluded that SSRI benefits were benefits "more 
attributable to advanced years than retirement or wage loss." 431 So.2d at 219. Merrill 
characterizes SSRI benefits as "retirement" or "pension," rather than wage replacement 
benefits. Even assuming that a pension or retirement plan is materially different from 
other wage replacement systems for the purposes of analysis under § 413(5) (which it is 
not), Merrill's characterization of the SSRI benefits program is faulty because it is based 
on exceptions to the general pattern of use rather than the general pattern itself. 
The general pattern and purpose of the Social Security retirement system is set out 
by the Social Security Administration: 
The OASDI program provides a comprehensive package of protection against the 
loss of earnings due to retirement, disability, and death. . . . Social Security 
benefits are intended to replace a portion of these lost earnings . . . . The 
monthly benefit amount to which an individual (or qualifying survivors) may 
become entitled to under the OASDI programs is based on the individual's taxable 
earnings during his or her lifetime. 
Overview of the Social Security Administration, http://www.ssa.gov/fmance/2006/ 
Overview.pdf, at 1 (last accessed Feb. 11, 2008) (emphasis added). The analysis 
advocated by Merrill and the Sasso court essentially ignores this statement of purpose 
and attempts to define the nature of the Social Security program by reference to the 
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exceptional, rather than the normal, use. As noted by the Court of Appeals below, 
"[w]hether a retired individual chooses to continue working has no bearing on the 
purpose of the benefits provided under the Social Security Act." Merrill v. Labor 
Comm'n., 2007 UT App 214,119 n. 2, 163 P.2d 741 (emphasis in original). Merrill's 
invocation of an amendment allowing workers to continue to receive unreduced SSRI 
benefits while still working, see Pet. Br. at 28, does not help him either. The mere fact 
that the law has been changed to allow a certain course of action does not change the 
purpose of the overall system of benefits it impacts. 
Both SSRI and workers compensation are designed to compensate individuals for 
lost wages due to their expected inability to work. The overlap may not be perfect, but it 
is sufficient to support a legislative judgment that the overlap should be reduced in the 
interest of fiscal responsibility. 
2. Section 413(5) is rationally aimed at preserving the fiscal integrity of 
the workers compensation system. 
Even assuming (counterfactually and for the sake of argument) the absence of any 
overlap or of a problem of duplication, § 413(5) would still survive constitutional 
scrutiny because it is reasonably aimed at preserving the fiscal integrity of Utah's 
workers compensation system. Courts, including in the cases cited by Merrill, have 
uniformly deemed this a legitimate government interest. See, e.g., Sasso v. Ram Property 
Management, 431 So.2d 204 (Fla. App. 1983). Merrill cites only one case in support of 
his puzzling contention that an offset of workers compensation benefits based on receipt 
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of SSRI benefits is not rationally related to the goal of preserving the fiscal integrity of 
the workers compensation system: Boan v. Richardson, 482 S.E.2d 162 (W.Va. 1996). 
The analysis used in Boan is unpersuasive, however. After acknowledging the 
fact that "any reduction of benefits can be seen as reasonably related to a legitimate goal 
of preserving the fiscal integrity of the Workers' Compensation Fund," id- at 168, the 
Boan Court nonetheless held the offset statute unconstitutional on the ground that 
workers compensation benefits, "while measured in part by prior wages, are by definition 
intended to compensate for several factors other than lost wages, past, present, or future, 
and are not just wage replacement and thus are neither welfare benefits or benefits 
attributable to advanced years." Id at 169 (internal quotation marks omitted). In 
acknowledging the rational relation of the classification to the goal of preserving fiscal 
integrity, while disagreeing with the method employed by the legislature, the Boan court 
eschewed the basic principles of rational basis review. Instead, the Court employed 
heightened scrutiny, which is indisputably not the applicable standard in this case. 
Merrill's argument is also undercut by Sasso v. Ram Property Management 431 
So.2d 204 (Fla. App. 1983), which upheld an offset statute similar to § 413(5) on one of 
the very grounds asserted here: that the receipt of SSRI benefits has a reasonable 
relationship to the goal of preserving the fiscal integrity of the workers compensation 
system by reducing premiums. Id at 20 (finding a rational relation on the ground that 
those receiving SSRI benefits may be more prone to work injury and therefore likely to 
increase employer insurance costs). 
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Ultimately, however, even in absence of other legal authority, common sense 
provides all the support for upholding the rational relationship between § 413(5)'s 
classification method and the fiscal integrity goal. It is axiomatic that a benefits offset 
provides a reduction in benefits paid out, which in turn enhances the fiscal condition of 
the workers compensation system. At the very least, it cannot be said that the legislature 
acted "irrationally" or "unreasonably" in drafting § 413(5) based on this logical 
relationship. That is all that is required to survive rational basis or deferential review and 
§ 413(5) can and should be upheld on this ground alone. 
B. Some of Merrill's Cases are Distinguishable 
Finally, it should be noted that some of the case law cited by Merrill is 
distinguishable on grounds that provide additional bases for upholding the Utah statute. 
First, the statute at issue in Romero v. Industrial Claims Appeals Office, 902 P.2d 896 
(Colo. App. 1995), was condemned because it irrationally distinguished between 
permanent total disability (PTD) benefits and permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits. 
Specifically, the Colorado statute overturned in Romero terminated PTD benefits for any 
worker who had reached the age of 65, without any comparable rule for workers entitled 
to PPD benefits. Under this statute, Romero, who had begun to collect SSRI benefits 
before his workplace injury, was precluded from receiving any PTD benefits since she 
was over the age of 65. Id. at 897. The court noted that if Romero had suffered only a 
PPD, her benefits would not have been reduced or offset by her receipt of SSRI. 
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In light of this distinction, the Romero court deemed the "duplication of benefits" 
argument articulated by the state to be irrational: 
[G]ranting that respondents' assumption, that persons 65 or older are eligible for 
retirement benefits, is a valid one, it provides no proper explanation of the purpose 
for the distinction made between those who are totally disabled and those who are 
only partially impaired. If we assume that most persons in both groups are eligible 
to receive retirement benefits and that the statute's purpose is to prevent the 
receipt of both these benefits and "duplicating" compensation benefits under the 
Act, there is no logical reason that has been suggested why persons with only 
partial disabilities should continue to receive such duplicating benefits while 
persons who are totally disabled are prevented from doing so. 
Id. at 902. In reaching this conclusion, the Romero court noted that "the statute's 
distinction between persons totally disabled and those only partially impaired 
distinguishes it from similar statutes adopted by other states which have received judicial 
approval." Id. at 903. "In addition," the court noted that "these other statutes do not 
make the disqualification dependent solely upon the claimant's age; the disqualified 
claimant must be receiving, or be eligible to receive, retirement benefits." Id 
The Utah statute is distinguishable from the Colorado statute on both of these 
grounds. First, and most obviously, § 413(5) is invoked on the basis of receipt of SSRI 
benefits, not on the basis of age. Second, the Utah statute makes no arbitrary distinction 
between PTD and PPD. Under §413(5), an older worker who suffers a workplace injury 
is entitled to full, unreduced workers compensation benefits for a period of 312 weeks 
without any offset for SSRI. This holds whether the injury is PTD or PPD. The 312-
week base period is set forth on the face of § 413(5) for PTD benefits. PPD benefits are 
statutorily capped at 312 weeks for all workers. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-412(6)(c)(i). 
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Thus, in Utah, a worker in Romero's situation would be treated identically vis-a-
vis the § 413(5) offset regardless of whether she suffered a PTD or a PPD. In either case, 
the worker would recover unreduced benefits without any SSRI offset for a minimum of 
312 weeks. In the case of a PTD, an offset could be imposed thereafter if the worker is 
receiving SSRI benefits. But in both cases a 312-week base period is guaranteed. The 
parallel treatment of both PTD and PPD benefits forecloses any reliance on Romero.10 
The Montana statute at issue in Reesor drew a similar (but converse) distinction. 
It limited PPD benefits upon eligibility for SSRI, while preserving liability for full PTD 
benefits. Reesor v. Montana State Fund, 103 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Mont. 2004). Reesor 
suffered a workplace injury at age 65—when he was already receiving SSRI. IdL at 1020. 
"Due to his age," Reesor received only an "impairment award" and was ineligible for 
"$20,081.25 in PPD benefits." Id Under these circumstances, the Montana Supreme 
In the Vogel case, the Tennessee Supreme Court offered similar grounds for 
reconciling its decision upholding a Tennessee statute with the Colorado Supreme Court 
decision in Romero. Specifically, the Vogel court noted that unlike the Colorado statute, 
the Tennessee statute "provides 260 weeks of benefits for any worker who becomes 
permanently and totally disabled after age sixty regardless of the age," so that "[ujnlike 
the Colorado statute, it does not deprive individuals like Vogel, seventy-three when 
injured, of benefits." Vogel 937 S.W.2d at 860-61. Such a provision clearly advances 
legitimate governmental objectives, even if harsher measures might not. Moreover, for 
reasons explained above, the Romero court's analysis also fails on the alternative ground 
that the Utah legislature is entitled to tackle one aspect of the "duplication" problem at a 
time. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Ok., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) 
("[Legislative] reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the 
problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind") (citations omitted); Baker v. 
Matheson, 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979) (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Ok., 348 
U.S. 483, 489 (1955)); Gottling v. PR Inc., 2002 UT 95 f 20, 61 P.3d 989 (citations 
omitted). 
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Court accepted the argument that "there is no legitimate rationale to completely eliminate 
a class of benefits to otherwise eligible claimants simply because of their age.55 Id at 
1023. 
The Montana statute is also distinguishable. A worker in Reesor5s position would 
be entitled to full PPD benefits (i.e., for 312 weeks) under the Utah statute without any 
SSRI offset. Thus, the Utah statute does not "completely eliminate55 any "class of 
benefits to otherwise eligible claimants simply because of their age.55 
Finally, Pierce v. LaFarouche Parish Council 762 So.2d 608 (La. 2000), is 
significantly distinguished from Merrill5s case because the Louisiana Constitution 
required the Court to apply a heightened standard of review to the offset statute at issue in 
that case. In Pierce, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that the under Louisiana's state 
constitution "[a] law that discriminates based upon age is unconstitutional unless the 
proponents of the statute . . . can carry their burden of proving that the classification 
substantially furthers a legitimate governmental purpose. Ultimately, the Court held that 
the statute was unconstitutional because the state had failed to meet its burden "of 
proving that [the statute] substantially furthered an appropriate governmental objective.55 
Id. at 614. The standard employed in Pierce differs significantly from the one applicable 
under the federal and Utah constitutions. Neither the "rational basis55 nor the 
"deferential55 standard of review requires that the reviewing court be "convinced55 or 
"shown proof5 that a classification actually, and much less substantially, furthers a 
legitimate interest. Instead, these standards demand only that there be enough of a logical 
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relationship between the classification and a legitimate governmental purpose to allow 
the legislature to "rationally" or "reasonably" conclude that the classification could 
further the interest. Since the Pierce Court's invalidation of Louisiana's offset statute 
rested on the skepticism resulting from a heightened standard of review, its conclusions 
do not provide Merrill with meaningful support in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The legislative decision to adopt a limited offset of SSRI against workers 
compensation benefits is no more susceptible to constitutional challenge than any of a 
wide range of legislative judgments in the Workers Compensation Act as to the 
appropriate level of benefits. Ultimately, the wisdom of any such legislative policy 
judgment is a matter for the legislature, not for the courts. Merrill's constitutional 
challenge to § 413(5) should be rejected. 
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I hereby certify that on the 19th day of February 2008,1 caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE WORKERS 
COMPENSATION FUND to be served via U.S. Postal Service, postage prepaid, 
on the following: 
Phillip B. Shell 
Day Shell & Liljenquist, L.C. 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, UT 84107 
Alan L. Hennebold 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
P.O. Box 146600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600 
Sharon J. Eblen 
Michael E. Dyer 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, L.C. 
257 East 200 South, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM 1 
UTAH WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT 
A CAREFUL BALANCING OF RIGHTS. 
1. 
4. 
5. 
Employer 
Exclusive remedy U. C. A. 
§34A-2-105. 
Action can only be brought in 
administrative proceedings. 
Speedy resolution. No lengthy jury trial 
with its uncertainties. Less costly process 
for the litigants. U.C.A. §§34A-2-801 & 
802 
Limited, predictable fixed 
damages. 
a . No pain and suffering damages. 
b . No projected future special 
damages. Damages paid as they 
accrue. 
B r o a d b a s e d r i s k spreading on 
industry through mandatory insurance or 
qualifying through bonding with Industrial 
Commission to be a self-insured employer. 
U.C.A. §34-A-2-201. 
Right to be reimbursed from third 
party recoveries §34A-2-106 minus 
injured worker's attorney's fees and 
costs incurred in collecting from the 
third-party tortfeasor. 
a. Employer--"trustee" of the cause 
of action for injured worker or 
dependent heirs in death cases 
b. However, see U.C.A. §§34A-2-
106(5)(b), 78-27-39 & 78-27-41 
regarding 40% subrogation and 
third party defendant damage 
limitation rule in third party civil 
actions brought by injured 
workers or dependent heirs in 
death cases. 
All employers treated alike. 
Injured Worker and/or 
Dependent Heirs 
1. A sure, predictable, though limited 
remedy because of mandatory 
insurance coverage. Less costly to 
pursue. 
2. No fault system ~ no reduction or 
elimination of workers compensation 
benefits by comparative fault. 
3. Comparatively speedy and 
i n e x p e n s i v e administrative 
process. U.C.A. §§34A-2-801 & 802 
4. Wage replacement benefits: (1) 
Temporary Total Disability—U.C.A. 
§34A-2-410; (2) Temporary Partial 
Disability—U.C.A. §34A-2-411; (3) 
Permanent Total Disability—U.C.A. 
§34A-2-413; (4) Death Benefits to 
dependent heirs-U.C.A. §34A-2-414. 
5. Impairment/Loss of bodily function 
benefits: Permanent Partial 
Disability—U.C.A. §34A-2-412. 
6. Medical Expense benefits: U.C.A. 
§34A-2-401. 
7. Preservation of right to pursue third parties 
for full damages—U.C.A. §34A-2-106. 
8. Employer and employee on same side in 
third party cases. 
9. Continuing jurisdiction of the industrial 
Commission to modify awards based on 
changes in injured employee's 
condi t ion. Utah Code Ann. §34A-
2-420 
10. All employees treated alike. 
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Phillip B. Shell #03861 
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-6800 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
Sharon J. Eblen #8652 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, L.C. 
257 East 200 South, Suite 800 
Sale Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-7900 
Attorneys for Respondents/Appellees 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
NATHAN H. MERRILL, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION, VERMAX 
OF FLORIDA, INC. dba DAKOTA 
CABINETS; WORKERS COMPENSATION 
FUND; and WAUSAU BUSINESS 
INSURANCE, 
Respondents/Appellees. 
STIPULATION AND CLARIFICATION 
OF FACTUAL RECORD 
Supreme Court Case No. 2007584 
ORIGINAL 
Petitioner Nathan H. Merrill and Respondents Vermax of Florida, [nc. dba Dakota 
Cabinets, and Wausau Business Insurance, respectfully submit this stipulation and clarification 
of the factual record in this case. Because there were no factual findings on some of the 
underlying factual issues in this case in the Labor Commission (which did not have 
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the statute in question), Petitioner's Brief 
is the only basis for some of the relevant facts before the Court. 
Thus, in order to avoid any dispute regarding the underlying facts or the 
representations made in Petitioner's Brief, Petitioner and Respondents jointly stipulate 
that the following is an accurate representation of Petitioner Nathan Merrill's income and 
benefits at the time periods identified in the table below: 
Total 
Time Period Sources of Income Yearly 
Income 
At the time of the 
May 14,1998 injury 
At the time of the 
April 13, 2001 injury 
After both injuries 
but before the § 
413(5) offset 
After the § 413(5) 
offset 
Earned 
Wages 
$50,000 
$31,200 
(not 
working) 
(not 
working) 
Workers Compensation 
Disability Benefits 
$0 
$0 
$20,540 
($395 per week) 
$13,940 
($268 per week) 
Social Security 
Retirement 
Benefits 
$0 
$0 
$13,200 
($1,100 per 
month) 
$13,200 
($1,100 per 
month) 
Social 
Security 
Disability 
Benefits 
$0 
$0 
$0 
$0 1 
$50,000 
$31,200 
$33,740 
1 $27,140 
2 
DATED THIS 19th day of February 2008. 
DAY SHEUr*%ILJENQUIST 
^ 
By Phillip B. Shell 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, L.C. 
Sharon J. Eblen 
Attorneys for Respondents/Appellees 
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